Exploring the Background: Puzzles, Afterthoughts, and Replies by Celano, B.
 Revus
Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of
Law / Revija za ustavno teorijo in ﬁlozoﬁjo prava 
in print | 2017
(- Already online -)











Bruno Celano, « Exploring the Background: Puzzles, Afterthoughts, and Replies », Revus [Online], in
print | 2017, Online since 05 December 2017, connection on 05 December 2017. URL : http://
revus.revues.org/3876  ; DOI : 10.4000/revus.3876 
This text was automatically generated on 5 December 2017.
All rights reserved





1 First of all, I wish to thank warmly those who have contributed to this forum, for their
comments and criticisms. In what follows, I will try to reply, as best I can, to the latter. I
am, however, well aware that my paper is tentative and in many respects weak. What
matters most to me, then, is having the opportunity to learn from my critics, and to
record and, when possible, follow, their suggestions.
2 Before I begin, however, let me remark that the analogy drawn by Segatti between my
essay and an exploration of what he, borrowing from Conrad, calls (XIX century’s) “blank
spaces on the earth”, aptly captures my attitude towards the whole field of enquiry (“the
biggest, the most blank, so to speak” as he suggests, quoting Conrad once again), of which
pre-conventions  are  only  a  small  region.  The  general  project  might  be  dubbed  “an
enquiry on the Normal”.1 And I think we all agree, apart from the merits (or demerits) of
my essay, on the importance of this project.
3 This territory is, it seems to me, for the most part, as yet, terra incognita, especially for
philosophers (there are outstanding exceptions, of course) – psychology and cognitive
science tread this path since long. Mine is only a partial, uncertain, and – in its basic
inspiration – non-original attempt, following, as best I can, the lead of my authorities.2
 
2 The social dimension of pre-conventions
4 Arena (2016: 59): “[Celano’s] explanation of embodied conventions needs to be further
developed in order to account for the social dimension of conventionality”.
Exploring the Background: Puzzles, Afterthoughts, and Replies
Revus, in print | 2017
1
5 Arena and Brigaglia both detected a gap in my account of pre-conventions (and this is one
of  the  main  points  of  Arena’s  paper).  I  say  nothing,  in  my  essay,  about  the  social
dimension  of  pre-conventions.  Worse:  as  Arena  rightly  points  out,  what  I  do  say
mistakenly suggests that merely convergent behaviour on the part of many individuals
may be a pre-convention, even when convergence is accidental.3 This neglects the fact
that, where a convention (and, recall, pre-conventions, as I define them, are a species of
conventions) is  in place,  it is  not by chance that the behaviours of many individuals
converge. 
6 This  gap is  filled  if,  as  Brigaglia  (2016:  Sec.  1)  suggests  (the  suggestion is,  however,
adumbrated also in Arena’s contribution), we include in the definition of the concept of
pre-convention  satisfaction  of  what  I  have  elsewhere  (Celano  1995)  called  the
“dependence condition” – i.e.,  where a convention is in place, each individual who is
party to the convention behaves as she does because the others behave in that way.
7 This condition, however, may be construed in different ways, according as to how the
“because” is understood.
8 Arena  rightly  observes  that  Lewis-conventions  present  us  with  a  particular  way  of
understanding  this  condition,  namely,  as  a  matter  of  –  on  the  background  of  a
predominant  coincidence  of  interests  –  conditional  preferences  for  conformity,  of
replicating, in one’s own reasoning, the others’ reasoning, and common knowledge (i.e.,
strategic rationality). It does not follow, however, that, as he also seems to suggest, this is
the only way in which the dependence condition may be understood. And this cannot be,
by definition, what accounts for the social dimension of pre-conventions. (Recall that pre-
conventions, by definition, are not amenable to rational explanation: they are not the
output of the reasoned pursuit – “a train of reasoning” –, by the relevant individuals, of
their interests.4) So, what accounts for the social dimension of pre-conventions must be
some other way of understanding the dependence condition.
9 Which way? The “because” in the dependence condition may be understood – and this is,
I think, the main bifurcation (Celano 1995 & Celano 2014) – either as a reason-relation
(paradigmatically,  strategic  reasoning,  on  the  background  of  shared  conditional
preferences for conformity) or as a causal non-intentional relation: each individual is
caused to behave as he does by the fact that the other individuals who are party to the
convention behave in that way. (The main way in which this may happen is by sheer
imitation.) In the case of pre-conventions, the latter is, it seems to me (as suggested by
Brigaglia 2016: Sec. 1), the proper understanding.
10 Thus, the correct front crawl stroke is pre-conventional (to the extent that it actually is)
because, although it is wired in the body of any expert swimmer, each expert swimmer
swims that way because (training, imitation) the others do. I do not mean that it cannot
happen that somebody swims the crawl because he deliberately decides to do this (maybe
as a way of pursuing a further end), or that he deliberately swims as he does because the
others do. This is, of course, possible. What I mean is that what the correct front crawl
stroke is – its identity –, is not determined, if not unintentionally and, thus, obliquely, by
such decisions. In this sense the correct front crawl stroke is not the output of a train of
thought.
11 These considerations lead us to the issue raised by Figueroa Rubio, namely, what kind of
explanation is appropriate to the coming into existence of a pre-convention. For reasons
that will be apparent in due course, however, I shall discuss this later (Sec. 5 below).
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 3 Pre-conventions and ordinary habits and
dispositions
12 One objection is raised by many contributors, albeit in different guises: what I call “pre-
conventions”, or at least most of them (and some of the examples I offer are, some of my
critics contend, of this kind: riding a bike, marching), are nothing more than behaviours
which,  although  they  have  now  become,  in  expert  practitioners,  fluid,  effortless,
unreflective  and  automatic  (a  second  nature),  are  the  result  of  the  internalisation,
through practice,  of  sets  of  rules.  This  may be an interesting phenomenon –  so  the
objection goes – but there is nothing so terribly new about it, nor does it follow that there
is  anything inherently normative in these behaviours.  They are,  trivially,  behaviours
conforming to given rules. This in no way calls into question the orthodox distinction
between fact and norm. In short, what I solemnly call “pre-conventions”, and treat as if
they were an interesting and revealing “new” phenomenon, are nothing but, trivially,
ordinary habits and acquired dispositions.
13 Two different issues, in fact, underlie these complaints.
14 First, the activities, or at least most of them, I refer to as “pre-conventions” are nothing
but  ordinary  activities:  they  are  not  (as  I  claim  in  Section  4  of  my  paper  of  pre-
conventions generally) “conventions that are mostly in the Background of our activities
and thoughts, and that, passing usually unnoticed, delimit their spaces”. They are not the
conditions of the possibility of other, “surface”, activities. They are, for the most part,
everyday activities that,  just like driving to work, people perform automatically,  as a
consequence  of  repeated  practice.  It  would  be  odd  to  say  that  driving  your  car
automatically is the condition of possibility of operating your car’s radio (Arena 2016: 65).
5
15 Second, my “pre-conventions” are nothing but, trivially, habits and dispositions which
are acquired as a consequence of repeated practice of a rule-governed activity.
16 I shall now take up these two points in turn.6
 
3.1 On the difference between living in an apartment on the fourth
floor and not being an earthworm
17 Arena (2016: 59):
“the relationship between the unintentionality of embodied conventions and the
Background is still imprecise, and /…/ this renders the notion of pre-conventions
unstable”:  “Irrespective  of  the  fact  that  Celano,  at  one  point,  defines  pre-
conventions as ‘conventions that are mostly in the Background of our activities and
thoughts, and that, passing usually unnoticed, delimit their spaces’, it seems to me
that, from the examples put forward, it follows that not all embodied conventions
are a fragment of the Background. The examples given, such as conventions that
establish how to swim the crawl or how to march, are, to my mind, on the surface”
(Arena 2016: 62).7
18 The issue is raised by Smith (2016: 70) relating to Lewis-conventions:8
“[Celano] describes [pre-conventions] as involving convergent behaviour ‘which is
not a biological regularity, and is the result of learning, but which is also automatic:
it  is spontaneous (unreflective),  rapid, fluid,  effortless.’  He also refers to them as
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conventions  that  ‘become  as  natural  as  breathing,  a  ‘second  nature’.’  If  this  is
intended  to  distinguish  pre-conventions  from  Lewis-type  conventions,  then  it
strikes me as a mis-step. As Celano acknowledges,  the following of a Lewis-type
convention can also become ‘second nature’,  and his  attempt to  show how this
differs from the way in which pre-conventions are second nature returns us to the
idea that the former, but not the latter, is supported by a ‘train of reasoning’.”
19 As we know already (above, section 2), Smith finds this characterisation obscure. I hope
that  my clarifications  above  will  now suffice  to  amend this  particular  flaw.  But  the
problem at which Smith is pointing is, at bottom, the one we are now facing: how is the
distinction to be drawn between, on the one hand, a tacit train of reasoning (or, on the
analogy I put forward in my paper, a tacit belief proper: “the apartment that I live in is on
the fourth floor”), and, on the other hand, the dispositions supporting a regularity of
behaviour that has now become second nature (on our analogy, the “belief”, improperly
so called, that I am not an earthworm)?9
20 The  following  of  a  Lewis-convention,  as  Smith  notes  (and acknowledges  that  I
acknowledge) in the passage I have just quoted, can also become second nature. This is
not, in itself, a serious problem for my account, I think: we should not, it seems to me,
rule out the possibility that a regularity of behaviour that originally, being the expression
of  a  tacit  train of  reasoning,  is  the outward side of  a  Lewis-convention,  may,  in the
passing of time, when the relevant behaviour becomes second nature, cease to be one,
becoming,  at  last,  a  preconvention.10 (And vice  versa:  the  “belief”  that  I  am not  an
earthworm has now become, in writing the paper,  and thanks to this discussion,  a –
usually tacit – belief of mine.) The problem is, however, how to draw this distinction in a
non-impressionistic or, worse, question begging, way. (By merely relying on the analogy,
or  saying  that,  in  the  passing of  time,  the  train  of  reasoning  supporting  a  Lewis-
convention may become “so tacit” that it ceases to be one - what could this mean?) In
reply to this objection, I can only:
(1) stress that I explicitly emphasised this difficulty in my paper.11 
(2) Repeat what I said there: “I should note a difficulty /…/: human beings are made in
such a way that everything, or almost everything – even the demonstration of Gödel’s
theorem /…/ – can, by virtue of a learning process, become automatic. Anything, or
almost anything, that can be learnt can become ‘second nature’. This fact threatens to
undermine” the definition of pre-conventions, so, “for example, it is possible that those
who follow a convention à la Lewis /…/, and for which this convention has become
obvious, have a ‘tacit understanding of it, which they cannot easily articulate to
outsiders’ (Sugden 1998: 379)” (Celano 2016: 13). And: “this is an endemic problem when
dealing with intentional phenomena” (Celano 2016: 13; italics now added), meaning by this
(as I explain in footnote 31 of my paper) that it does not “specifically concern the
phenomena that we are discussing; it affects, rather, the whole domain of intentional
phenomena”.
“[In] the case of those who follow a Lewis-convention which has become for them ‘second
nature’ we can say, of course, that what they are doing is implementing a train of
reasoning that is ‘within them’, in a tacit and non-articulated way /…/ But it is unclear
what that might mean, if not that they behave as if they were doing this. But this appears
to be question-begging. When the convention has become ‘second nature’ what guides
their conduct is, in some sense, what they actually do”: “one should distinguish between
the sense in which a ‘train of reasoning’ supporting a Lewis-convention can originally –
i.e., when the convention comes into existence – be called ‘tacit’; and the sense in which it
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can be called ‘tacit’ when the convention has become ‘second nature’” (Celano 2016: 13–
14).
And, finally: this problem, I say explicitly, “is an hard one” and “I am unable to resolve [it]” 
(footnote 31 of my paper; italics now added).12 As a consequence, I find myself unable to
reply to Brigaglia’s objection (2016: Sec. 3.4) concerning the “propositionality” of (what
he calls) “rules”, and the alleged “non-propositionality” of “norms”. This distinction, as I
(confusedly, as Brigaglia shows) conceived it, must be in the same ballpark as that
between the belief (be it tacit or explicit) that I live in an apartment on the fourth floor,
and my (improperly so called, before writing the paper) tacit “belief” that I am not an
earthworm.13
(3) To this, let me now add the following. In talking of pre-conventions as conditions of
the possibility of – or, as I did in my paper, as delimiting the space for – further activities
(and, in this sense, as part of the Background), I do not imply that they are necessary 
presuppositions, staying in some logical or conceptual relationship to the latter. That the
Background comprises this or that item is, for the most part, a contingent matter of fact.14
So, for instance, to return to Arena’s example, it is true that automatically driving my car
is not a conceptually or logically necessary condition of the possibility of operating my
car’s radio. But, as a contingent matter of fact, that X drives automatically to work is,
given his abilities and the environment in which he finds himself, a condition of the
possibility for X to listen to the radio while going to work. It is such a condition in the
context of his life.15
 
3.2 “Pre-conventions” nothing but ordinary habits and acquired
dispositions
21 Duarte d’Almeida (2017: Par. 7): 
“So do pre-conventions ‘exist’ /…/ ? There do seem to be many actions which are
(a) not biological regularities, (b) the outcome of learning processes, and (c) actions
that we do come, with practice, to perform automatically and spontaneously. It also
seems  plausible  to  think  that  arbitrary  conventions  may  and  do  feature
prominently in such learning processes, and that, with practice, such conventions
do  ‘recede’  into  the  ‘background’  and  come  to  pass  ‘unnoticed’.  So  the  answer
would appear to be that, yes, pre-conventions do exist”.16 
22 This, however, is not “particularly striking”, says Duarte d’Almeida. We knew already that
such a thing may happen. There is no mystery about these phenomena.
23 Or is there? In discussing my claim that pre-conventions are normative facts,  Duarte
d’Almeida asks: 
“what does [Celano] give us by way of argument to support such a view? Not very
much, as far as I  can see. He does avail himself of several metaphors, and he is
particularly fond of Searle’s ‘the body takes over’ phrase. But he goes on, I think, to
mischaracterize Searle’s point: ‘The central idea is aptly captured by the phrase the
body  takes  over.  What  the  body  is  doing,  from  now  on,  is  not  a  mere  de  facto
regularity, but something that is in between a norm and a regularity’ (Celano 2016:
15)”.
24 Why is this a mischaracterisation? In the relevant passage, says Duarte d’Almeida, 
“Searle is offering an account /…/ of how it is that we come to acquire and develop
such physical skills and to perform many actions, as we do, automatically: ‘repeated
practice  and  training  in  a  variety  of  situations  eventually  makes  the  causal
functioning of [explicit] representation [e.g. of verbal instructions of what one is
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supposed to do] unnecessary in the exercise of the skill’ (Searle 1983: 151). Searle’s
point,  then,  is  an explanatory point  about how such types of  behavior  come to
emerge, and about the role – the causal role – played by rules, and by rule-learning,
in that process”.
25 I will deal with the “no argument” charge later (below, section 10). But what about the
mischaracterisation charge?
26 It is true that I am particularly fond of this passage of Searle’s. My comment about it,
quoted  at  length  by  Duarte  d’Almeida  (and  reproduced  in  the  quotation  above:  my
“mischaracterisation” of Searle’s point), was meant as an explanation of Searle’s claim
that  with  practice  “the  rules  do  not  become  ‘wired  in’  as  unconscious  Intentional
contents”, and, specifically, as a gloss on some of the lines in Searle’s text, omitted, for
reasons of space, in the quotation (that also Duarte d’Almeida reproduces) contained in
my paper. According to Duarte d’Almeida, it seems, Searle is claiming, in the passage I am
fond  of,  that,  with  practice,  the  very  same  behaviour  that  a  beginner  holds  as  a
consequence of trying to follow the rules is held, by the advanced skier, automatically
and unreflectively. I will now restore the relevant lines from Searle’s text, motivating my
alleged mischaracterisation.
27 This is the quotation contained in my paper, reproduced by Duarte d’Almeida:
“as the skier gets better he does not internalize the rules better, but rather the
rules  become  progressively  irrelevant.  The  rules  do  not  become  ‘wired  in’  as
unconscious  Intentional  contents,  but  the  repeated  experiences  create  physical
capacities,  presumably  realized as  neural  pathways,  that  make the  rules  simply
irrelevant.  ‘Practice  makes  perfect’  not  because  practice  results  in  a  perfect
memorization of the rules, but because repeated practice enables the body to take
over and the rules to recede into the Background /.../ On my view, the body takes
over and the skier’s  Intentionality  is  concentrated on winning the race”  (Searle
1983: 150-151. Italics are mine).
28 And here are, restored (in italics), the lines my alleged mischaracterisation was meant to
be a gloss to:
“repeated practice enables the body to take over and the rules to recede into the
Background. /…/ The advanced skier doesn’t follow the rules better, rather he skis in a
different sort of way altogether. His movements are flowing and harmonious, whereas the
beginning skier, consciously or unconsciously concentrating on the rules, makes movements
which are jerky, abrupt, and inept. The expert skier is flexible and responds differently to
different conditions of terrain and snow; the beginning skier is inflexible, and when different
and unusual situations come up he tends simply to fall down. A downhill racer on the course
moves very rapidly, over 60 miles an hour, over a terrain that is rough and uneven. His body
makes thousands of very rapid adjustments to variations in the terrain. Now which is more
plausible: when his body makes these adjustments, it is only because he is making a very
rapid series of unconscious calculations applying unconscious rules; or is it rather that the
racer’s body is so trained that these variations in the terrain are dealt with automatically?
On my view, the body takes over and the skier’s Intentionality is concentrated on
winning the race” (Searle 1983: 150-151).
29 Are we willing to say, in the light of this passage (including the restored lines), that –
what Searle claims is that –, with practice, the very same behaviour that a beginner holds
as  a  consequence  of  trying  to  follow  the  rules  is  held,  by  the  advanced  skier,
automatically and unreflectively? This would indeed strike me as a mischaracterisation,
both of Searle’s point, and of the phenomenon he so vividly describes.17 
30 So,  the  reason  why  I  am particularly  fond  of  Searle’s  1983  key  passage  about  what
happens,  in learning how to ski,  when the body takes over,  is  this.  In practising an
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activity according to explicit rules the body itself, thanks to repeated practice, little by
little understands what is the right way of performing the relevant actions. In doing so,
the body’s understanding goes well beyond what the rules say. The body develops its own
criteria of correctness in performing the action (this is what its “knowing-how” consists
in). Rule-guided behaviour becomes norm-guided behaviour (in Brigaglia’s terminology).
The relevant norms are there, in the advanced skier’s actual, regular, behaviour. This is
also an explanatory point,  but it  is there,  in the advanced skier’s behaviour,  that the
justification for behaving in precisely that way lies.
31 This, I think, is the phenomenon that Searle’s 1983 key passage so vividly depicts.18
32 Duarte  d’Almeida  also  very  briefly  mentions  and  criticises  my  –  itself  sketchy  –
reconstruction  of  the  main  (as  far  as  my  purposes  are  concerned)  lines  of  Searle’s
argument in chapter 6 of The Construction of Social Reality  (1995), entirely devoted to a
discussion of the thesis of the Background, and, specifically, my reading of a second key
passage of Searle’s (which I am also very fond of; Searle 1995: 141-142) drawn from it – the
topic  of  section 7  of  my paper.  Which,  I  claim there,  allow us  to  conclude that  the
Background of intentionality, comprises (also) normative facts, as I understand them in
my paper. 
33 This is not the place for engaging in a detailed exegesis of chapter 6 of Searle’s 1995 book.
It  is a rich,  intricate text,  implying,  I  think,  more than what is explicitly stated,  and
raising awkward puzzles. So, I will simply reproduce Duarte d’Almeida’s critical remark,
and comment on it. Here is Duarte d’Almeida’s remark (2017: Par. 12–13):
“It  may be true that,  as Searle points out (and as Celano points out that Searle
points out), participants in institutional activities develop tendencies, dispositions
and skills that are ‘functionally equivalent’ to the systems of rules of the relevant
institutions: ‘The basic idea /.../ is that one can develop, one can evolve, a set of
abilities that are sensitive to specific structures of intentionality without actually
being constituted by intentionality. One develops skills and abilities that are, so to
speak, functionally equivalent to the system of rules, without actually containing
any representations or internalizations of those rules’ (Searle 1995: 142). But this,
again,  despite  what  Celano  suggests,  is  not  the  same  as  saying  that  ‘here  /.../
entities intermediate between rules and regularities, embodied norms /.../ emerge’
(Celano 2016: 29). We should avoid conflating (a) claims about how it is that pre-
conventions may come to emerge (and the role that arbitrary rules may play in that
causal process), (b) claims about the ‘functional’ role of pre-conventions, and (c)
claims about their metaphysical status”.
34 My comments: 
(1) Duarte d’Almeida, it seems to me, treats Searle’s discussion in chapter 6 of the 1995
book as making the same point as the key passage about what advanced skiers do in his
Intentionality (1983:  150-151),  discussed  above.  There  is  however,  a  deep  difference
between these two texts of Searle’s. The latter is a description of the kind of phenomena I
am concerned with, the former an articulated theoretical discussion, more sophisticated
than the treatment in the 1983 book. What is described in the 1983 passage is extensively
theorised  in  the  1995  book.  It  seems  that,  in  the  passing  of  time,  the  topic  –  the
Background  –  has  become  more  and  more  intriguing,  complex,  and  theoretically
problematic  in  the  eyes  of  the  author,  leading  him to  progressively  more  complex,
sophisticated, and problematic conclusions about it (in this connection, the turning point
is, I think, chapter 8 of Searle’s 1992 book). This is why, on the one hand, I included the
1983 passage in the section of my paper devoted to offering examples of the kind of
phenomena I am interested in, and, on the other hand, I have chosen the 1995 argument
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as one of the four non-original arguments which I offer in support of my claims. Neither
my sketchy reconstruction, nor Duarte d’Almeida’s critical remark about it, do justice to
the complexity of Searle’s 1995 argument, and especially to the puzzles raised by it.
35  (2) Searle’s argument in the 1995 book is meant to account (also) for cases in which the
agent  is  not  following,  either  consciously  or  unconsciously,  rules  (in  a  naive,  pre-
Wittgensteinian sense of the phrase “rule-following”), and he does not, and did never,
know that  the rules  say this  or  that  (“indeed the very same people  who created or
participated in the evolution of the institution may themselves have been totally ignorant
of the system of rules”; Searle 1995: 128). Often, the rules themselves, says Searle, are not
codified.  Even  when  they  are  codified,  he  says,  “most  of  us  are  unaware  of  these
codifications”.  And,  he  adds,  “even if  we were  aware, the  codifications  are  not  self-
interpreting. We have to know how to interpret or apply the codified rules” (Searle 1995:
128; in general, the thesis of the Background is motivated, “in the first place”, by the fact
that “the intentionality is not self-interpreting” (Searle 1995: 140); “the rules are never
self-interpreting”  (Searle  1995:  142)).  The  latter  is  an  extremely  important  point  (it
renders, I think, the gist of Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument, as reconstructed in
section 6 of my paper). It entails that even the following of well-known, codified rules
requires Background abilities and dispositions, namely, that such factual structures set
criteria of correctness for – i.e., fix the right way of – using concepts generally (and, thus,
reasons and rules).  In fact,  Searle  includes among the items in the Background “the
ability to apply /…/ categories”, in perceiving something as something and, generally, in
all sorts of intentional states (Searle 1995: 133). This is, I think, a telling (and, no doubt,
puzzling) claim, which should give pause to anyone who is inclined to think that Searle’s
point,  in  this  chapter,  is  only an  explanatory  one  –  as  opposed  to  one  concerning
justification,  and the right  way of  doing something (specifically,  following rules;  the
iteration – the right way of following the rule – is what matters, here). The claim seems to
be  this:  the  right  way  (a  normative  point)  of  following  a  rule  depends  on  causal
structures, which are not, and cannot – for conceptual reasons – be represented in the
contents  of  the  rule  itself,  or  of  further  rules.  We  might  say,  using  Brigaglia’s
terminology,  that  rules  only function – that  is,  they only fix the right  way of  doing
something – against a Background of norms.19 This Background is constituted by causal
structures – factual entities; in short, normative facts.
36  (3) In the light of this, it seems to me plainly wrong to maintain, as Duarte d’Almeida
seems to do, that what Searle has in mind is (only) the case in which an individual, as a
consequence  of  being  acquainted  with  a  rule,  comes  to  perform  unreflectively  and
automatically what the rule says. There is no doubt that Searle has in mind also this kind
of  case,  and that  the  Background is  meant  to  account  also  for  it.  There  are  several
passages along these lines in the 1995 book’s chapter. Nor did I deny this. But it seems to
me that Searle’s considerations in this chapter go well beyond this kind of cases.  Or,
better, they show that also in cases of this kind there is, buried in the apparent simplicity
of coming to perform automatically what the rules say, something peculiar at work – the
phenomena I tried to capture by using the phrase “normative facts”.20
37  (4) Given this, it seems to me wrong, again, to maintain that Searle’s point in this chapter
of the 1995 book is only an explanatory one. It is, no doubt, also an explanatory one (the
main  question  is,  what  the  causal  role  of  rules  constitutive  of  institutions  is).  The
Background works as a kind of causation. But what we need, says Searle (1995: 141), is “a
type of causation” which has “a rational structure”.
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38  (5) I concede that Searle’s talk of “functional equivalence” of items in the Background
and  rules  may  –  indeed,  should  –  be  read  as  expressing  also  the  thought  that  the
Background performs a causal role. But the key passage in the 1995 book links “functional
equivalence” to the Background structures’ being “sensitive” and “responsive” (Searle’s
words; 1995: 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146) to intentional contents – specifically, to rules.
This is the crux of the matter. Duarte d’Almeida gives us no explanation at all of this
puzzling claim.21
39  (6) Duarte d’Almeida rightly reminds me that “we should avoid conflating (a) claims
about how it  is  that  pre-conventions may come to emerge /…/,  (b)  claims about the
‘functional’  role  of  pre-conventions,  and (c)  claims about  their  metaphysical  status”.
There  is  a  misunderstanding,  here,  due  to  my  inaccurate  choice  of  words.  Duarte
d’Almeida’s  warning is  prompted,  as  we have seen (in  the  quotation above),  by  this
passage of mine, which in turn immediately follows the reproduction, in my paper, of
Searle’s 1995 key passage: “here /.../ entities intermediate between rules and regularities,
embodied norms /.../ emerge”. The misunderstanding is this: my remark was not meant
as a remark about the emergence of the sort of normative facts I am interested in (the
Background abilities and dispositions Searle is talking about). It was, rather, a remark
about the (so I claim) emergence in Searle’s argument of the notion of such a phenomenon.
What I wrote is, in fact, “this [meaning, Searle’s key passage] is the crucial step. Here
[meaning, at this juncture of Searle’s argument], once again [meaning, as we have seen
already in the case of Lewis, Goodman, and Wittgenstein], entities intermediate [meaning,
the notion of entities intermediate] between rules and regularities, embodied norms /…/
emerge”. I grant that this was, at best, equivocal. The clarifications I am now adding, in
square brackets, come too late.
40  (7) Duarte d’Almeida rightly reminds me that “we should avoid conflating /…/ (b) claims
about the ‘functional’ role of pre-conventions, and (c) claims about their metaphysical
status”. This makes good sense, but how is it supposed to impinge on my account? We
should  avoid  forgetting  that,  sometimes,  claims about  the  functional  role  of  X  have
implications concerning the “metaphysical status” of X. And this seems to me a case of
this sort.
41 (8) There is a suggestion, in my paper, concerning Searle’s argument in the 1995 book,
which none of my critics, as far as I can see, has commented upon. Here it is in italics: “
This  is  the  crucial  step.  Here,  once  again,  entities  intermediate  between  rules  and
regularities, embodied norms (or, if you will, the pineal gland), emerge”. The point of this
reference to Descartes’ often ridiculed escamotage for relating intentionality (cogitationes)
and material causes (res extensa) was precisely to suggest that Searle’s remarks about non-
intentional structures, neurophysiological factors, which are “sensitive” to structures of
intentionality (specifically, to rules), and as “functionally equivalent” to the latter, are no
less puzzling. That is to say,  we are still  in need of a perspicuous elucidation of this
phenomenon. Once again, it seems, we are stuck with the pineal gland, or something akin
to it.
 
4 Mistaken examples 
42 Many critics complain about some of my examples.
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43 Some of these remarks relate to behaviour that starts as the conscious, deliberate attempt
to  follow explicit  rules,  or  Lewis-conventions,  that  becomes,  in  the  passing  of  time,
second nature. I  dealt with this kind of cases in the previous section. There are also,
however, objections specifically directed at my choice of examples.
44 In the case of some of these objections there may be some misunderstanding at work.
Sánchez  Brigido  (2017:  Sec.  3)  rejects  “the  idea  that  all  the  regularities  that  Celano
mentions by way of examples are conventional in character”. This, however, seems to
forget  my explicit  warning,  at  the  beginning of  Section 3  of  my paper:  “let  us  now
consider some examples of the kind of phenomena I have in mind. Not all the things that
fall in each of the areas that we shall now review are conventions. But in each of these
areas there is room for the conventional”.22
45 One of the objections, however, is precisely to the point.
46 Smith (2016: 72): 
“it is plausible that playing chess well involves both abiding by certain conventions
and a certain know-how that cannot be reduced to a set of rules. However, it does
not follow that the conventions can be equated with that know-how, so as to entitle
us to say that the conventions are not reducible to a set of rules”. 
47 Smith is right. What I wrote is, at best, badly misleading. It implies that conventions such
as those defining the basic moves allowed in the game, and which may easily be listed in
the first few pages of an handbook, are – not, ordinary conventions, but rather – pre-
conventions. This is a mistake.
48 “Indeed [he goes on arguing], it is tempting to say that the conventions of chess are (by
and large) confined to the rules of chess, and that the know-how involved in being able to
play chess well is non-conventional. For one thing, that know-how need not involve any
form of agreement, even in Celano’s extended sense of ‘agreement’. We can imagine a
community in which only one person possesses that know-how; everyone else plays chess
poorly” (Smith 2016: 72). 
49 This, however, I find unpersuasive. What I should have said is the following: playing chess
– a paradigm of a game defined by explicit rules (the object of knowing-that), which can
be cast in the form of a formalised or even mechanical procedure – involves, in humans at
least, more than knowing that the bishop moves so and so, and so on, and the following of
these rules (when rule-following is understood in a naive, pre-Wittgensteinian sense). It
also involves a know-how concerning appropriate strategies, correctness in dealing with
one’s opponent, how to administer the time left for one’s moves, proper behaviour in a
tournament setting, how to play simultaneously with many opponents, and the rich set of
ways of playing that characterise masters (of course, not the same for all of them). These
things are, in large part, a matter of style (as Smith himself suggests, in note 20 of his
commentary).23 I do not claim that these things must all be a matter of pre-conventions.24
It is,  however, very plausible, to say the least,  that under some of these respects the
behaviour of expert players can also be a matter of convention. (I do not find it at all “
tempting”, then, to say that “the conventions of chess are (by and large) confined to the
rules of chess, and that the know-how involved in being able to play chess well is non-
conventional”.)  On  the  other  hand,  I  find  Smith’s  remark  that  “we  can  imagine  a
community in which only one person possesses that know-how; everyone else plays chess
poorly” puzzling. It is true that we can imagine a restricted community of chess players
in which only one person plays well. This, however, does not show that knowing how to
play well is not a matter of agreement with players outside that restricted community. If,
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however, the thought is that it is possible that the whole community of chess players,
save one, play chess poorly, I find this difficult to understand. “Poorly” relative to what?25
 
5 Reasons and causes
50 The notion of a pre-convention as a normative fact, as I more or less precisely (on the
concept  of  normative  fact,  see  next  section)  characterise  it,  calls  into  question  the
distinction  between  reasons  (from  now  on,  by  “reason”  I  mean,  unless  otherwise
specified, justificatory reasons) and causes. The distinction between facts and norms does
not,  of  course,  identify  with  the  distinction  between  causes  and  reasons.  The  two
distinctions,  however,  are  tightly  connected.  Causes  are  facts;  reasons  translate  into
“oughts”. Specifically, pre-conventions (and most likely other items in the Background)
explain behaviour, and they also guide it – they, thus, also justify it (when it conforms to
the pre-conventional regularity).
51 Unsurprisingly,  many  of  my  critics  find  the  idea  that  some  causes  may  be  reasons
problematic, if not a blatant category mistake. 
52 Moreso (2016: 78): 
“the Ontological Commitment Thesis [i.e., pre-conventions are abstract entities] and
the Normative Bite Thesis [i.e., “pre-conventions have a normative dimension, they
allow us to assess whether certain human actions are right practices of skiing or
riding a bike”] are together both incompatible with the idea that pre-conventions
are facts which have causal powers in human behaviour. And if we abandoned the
ontological  thesis,  we could not obtain normative determination.  That is  to say,
either  pre-conventions  (as  part  of  the  Background)  are  part  of  our  causal
explanation of human behaviour or pre-conventions are abstract entities able to
determine human behaviour normatively. [Footnote omitted] In the first case, pre-
conventions lack normative meaning, while in the second pre-conventions cannot
integrate our causal explanation of human actions. Tertium non datur”. 
53 Sánchez Brigido (2017: Sec. 3): 
“the problem is how it is possible that there are facts (something that belongs to
the  aspects  of  the  world  governed  by  relations  of  causality  understood  very
broadly) which are normative (a domain to which causality /…/ does not belong)”.26
54 On this  score,  I  plead guilty.  (That  the distinction between context  of  discovery and
context of justification cannot be maintained all the way down, however, is no news.)
What I, following the lead of my authorities, have tried to show is this.
55 In principle, and as a rule, we should distinguish carefully between causes and reasons, to
the maximum possible extent. However, in articulating the architecture of our reasons
for action, and if we dig deep in the reasons we have for behaving the way we do, we
reach bedrock:  at  the  end of  the  day,  we  cannot  but  cite  facts  (in  the  case  of  pre-
conventions,  regularities of behaviour) which both explain and justify our behaviour.
Facts like, for instance, the fact that, often, we happen to notice the same analogies, or
that, in inductive inferences, we happen to project the same properties (section 4 of my
paper); the “practice” – at bottom, participation in a shared form of life – which underlies
our mastery of a concept and our following a rule (section 5 of my paper);  the non-
intentional behavioural data constituting the Background against which intentionality,
and thus normativity, only works (i.e., it determines conditions of satisfaction) (section 6
of my paper). These are, indeed, facts, playing the role of causes in explanations of our
behaviour.  They  are,  however,  facts  which  manifest  themselves  when we  follow the
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thread of our reasons. These facts also guide our behaviour, that is, they also fix, they
determine, the right way of doing something. They are, in this sense, normative facts.
56 Before discussing this notion (in the next section), however, two further remarks are in
place here.
57 (1) Figueroa Rubio’s comments, too, raise the reasons v. causes issue. In his commentary,
however, this distinction is run together with the further supposed distinction between
intentional and causal explanations of behaviour and action. As we know already (above,
section 2) he asks “what kind of explanation fits better with behaviours that could be
categorised as pre-conventions?” (Figueroa Rubio 2017: Sec. 1).27
58 The  alternative  Figueroa  Rubio  poses  is  “whether  what  fits  better  is  intentional
explanation  or  causal  explanation,  or  whether  perhaps  there  is  some  other  kind  of
explanation which awaits us so that we can explain pre-conventions” (Figueroa Rubio
2017: Sec. 1). This distinction should be understood thus: 
“on  the  one  hand,  intentional  explanation  appears  with  agency.  When  some
behaviour is understood to be an action, we attribute a mind to the being whose
behaviour  has  been  identified.  In  doing  this,  we  attribute  mental  states  and
thoughts (e.g., propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, expectations and desires) to
the agent and we represent the behaviour as governed by reasons. On the other
hand,  causal  explanation  appeals  to  the  relationship  between  events  (or  facts),
focusing on the physiological aspect of behaviour.  Causal explanation shows the
behaviour to be governed by laws of nature” (Figueroa Rubio 2017: Sec. 2).
59 I find this alternative misconceived. On any plausible account, mental states are causes of
human,  and non-human animals’,  behaviour  and action.  Intentional  explanation is  a
species of causal explanation. For the alternative to have any bite we should, I think,
understand by “reasons” justificatory reasons. These, in turn, are to be understood as the
possible contents of mental states. Thus, the issue is not, in fact, the distinction between
two different kinds of explanation. It is rather, once again, the one raised by Moreso and
Sánchez Brigido, namely, whether causes can be reasons (and, whether abstract entities
can be causes; below, section 7). That, in providing a causal explanation of behaviour and
action we understand them as part of nature, is, to me, uninformative. What else could
human behaviour, or action, be, if not part of nature? Are we supposed to believe that
minds are not natural phenomena?
60 Explaining behaviour, or action, through laws (of nature) is another matter, of course. The
notion of a law of nature is, however, so fraught with difficulties that I find it risky, to say
the least,  to adopt the policy of  relying on it  for building a dichotomy between two
mutually  exclusive  kinds  of  explanation  (meaning  by  “explanation”,  as  I  have  just
determined, pointing to the causes of a given phenomenon). “Laws of nature” are a mixed
bunch. Different sorts of regularities, or generalisations, fall under this heading. They are
not so safe and reliable, waterproof as it were, as XIX century men took them to be. We
shouldn’t, probably, think of them, or all of them, as universally quantified undefeasible
conditionals.  And,  on the other hand,  it  would be odd,  in the light of  contemporary
developments of psychology, cognitive science, and the neurosciences, to assume that
explaining behaviour,  or  action,  by appeal  to mental  states is  different in kind from
identifying  natural  regularities.  In  sum,  we  cannot,  I  think,  rest  content  with  the
traditional  shape  of  the  “explanation  v.  understanding”  (or  perhaps  Natur- v.
Geisteswissenschaften) debate.
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61 (2) That some causes may be reasons of the behaviour they cause is a disturbing thought.
It  should be noticed,  however,  that there is  another side – the reverse side – to the
reasons v. causes divide: can justification be explanation?
62 On this issue, I  cannot but quote Bernard Williams’ seminal 1981 paper: “if there are
reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for those reasons, and if they do,




63 The opening paragraph of my paper (Celano 2016) reads:
“I will argue that there are entities that can be plausibly called ‘conventions’, which
are neither mere de facto regularities, nor rules (norms), but that – in a sense to be
specified – have both the character of de facto regularities, as well as a normative
character: they are, literally, ‘normative facts’. This paper attempts to isolate these
entities”.
64 In this passage, Duarte d’Almeida detects three claims. The first is the claim “that ‘there
are entities’ of a certain sort”. What concerns us now are the second and the third. Duarte
d’Almeida apparently finds both of  them obscure.  Happily,  however,  the third claim,
suitably rephrased, helps us in dealing with the second (it “helps readers to understand
the second claim” [i.e., the claim that pre-conventions “are not de facto regularities, and
that  they  are  not  rules  or  norms”]  more  clearly”,  he  says).  The  third  claim,  Duarte
d’Almeida writes, is the claim that
“those  entities  [i.e.,  pre-conventions]  have  both  a  normative  character  and  the
character of de facto regularities: which must mean, I gather, that what I called the
‘second’ claim is really to be understood as the claim that those entities are neither
de facto regularities as opposed to norms, nor norms as opposed to de facto regularities”
(Duarte d’Almeida 2017: Par. 1).
65 That’s right. This is why I inserted the word “but” between the second and the third
theses. (I do not mean that I did it on purpose, it just came to me naturally.) Duarte
d’Almeida (2017: Par. 3) further remarks that 
“the  claims  are  also  not  all  equally  important.  The  third  is  philosophically
interesting, and Celano knows it. That is probably why he pitches his essay as an
attempt to show that the ‘entities’ he is concerned with, his ‘pre-conventions’, are
entities of a ‘peculiar sort’ (as he says in his abstract) that somehow straddle the
commonly accepted distinction between facts and norms (Celano 2016: 9-10)”. 
66 That’s right, once again. Now that we have gained some understanding, let us discuss
these claims.29
67 The claim that  pre-conventions are,  in this  sense,  “normative facts” obviously raises
difficulties. Chiassoni (2017: Sec. 2) rules out, or so it seems, the very possibility of 
“mysterious entities, which would simultaneously partake in both the factual and
the normative. /…/ We can always and profitably keep apart, for any individual
event whatsoever, the factual and the normative”. 
68 My claim is, in fact, that pre-conventions are entities (not the only ones, presumably) of
this troubling sort.30
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69 Sánchez Brigido (2017: Sec. 3): “Celano is very imprecise when characterising normative
facts. He does not characterise the idea of a fact, or the idea of a norm, or the relation
between them”.31
70 This is plainly true. I rely, in my paper, on an intuitive understanding of what a fact, or a
norm, is.  Sánchez Brigido is right in suggesting that a fully-fledged treatment of the
phenomena I am concerned with requires an extensive discussion, and analysis, of these
notions.
71 What I do not see, however, is how lack of this extensive discussion vitiates my argument.
I have, it seems to me, used the notions fact and norm in an intuitively plausible, rather
commonsensical way.32
72 And, building on this, the notion of normative fact which I have used seems to me an
intelligible and relatively well-determined one. (Which is not to say, of course, that it is a
coherent notion, or that it is intuitively plausible that there actually are normative facts,
so understood.) A normative fact, in this sense, is a fact that fixes, determines, the right
way of doing something, and in this way guides behaviour.
73 “Normative facts – Sánchez Brigido (2017: sec. 3) further claims – can /…/ be understood
in two ways. A normative fact is either a fact that engenders normativity in some way or
an item with a sui generis nature. Either it has a nature of its own, something which does
not belong to the domain of facts or to the domain of norms, or it belongs to one of these
domains and is somehow related to the other”. He goes on saying that 
“on the one hand, Celano should clarify whether he is claiming that facts determine
(or give rise to, ground, fix, etc.) norms, which presupposes that they are different
items (facts and norms) related in some way, or whether they have a sui generis
nature. Celano is ambiguous about this” (Sánchez Brigido 2017: Sec. 3).
74 I disagree. I do not, in fact, fully understand this alternative. A “normative fact” is like a
“destructive earthquake”. Just like the latter is an earthquake which destroys, the former
is a fact which guides behaviour, i.e. which fixes the right way of doing something (and, in
this sense, fixes the identity of a norm, or a concept). I can see no ambiguity here – which
is not to say that it is clear how such a thing could happen, or that I gave a perspicuous
account of this alleged phenomenon. The alternative posed by Sánchez Brigido, whether a
normative fact is something different from a fact, or a norm, sans phrase, or a fact which
gives rise to a norm (which in turn fixes the right way of doing something; “whether
normative facts are facts that determine (or generate, fix, etc.) norms or whether they are
a sui  generis  kind of  items”;  Sánchez Brigido 2017:  Sec.  3),  sounds  to  me like  asking
whether a destructive earthquake is something different from an earthquake, or whether
it is an earthquake which gives rise to destruction (which in turn itself destroys). I can see
no alternative, here.33
75 To repeat: I do not claim that I have fully explained how the notion normative fact can be a
coherent  one,  nor  do  I  claim  that  I  gave  a  perspicuous  account  of  this  alleged
phenomenon. This, as I understand it, is obviously a paradoxical notion. On the one hand,
it involves the idea that some causes are reasons (above, section 5). On the other hand, it
involves the idea that abstract entities can be causes (below, section 7).34 Philosophers, I
said, distinguish “with good reason” (section 1 of my paper), between facts and norms.
My claim is that, when we look at what is normally under our eyes – and is not, because of
this, usually seen by us –, such paradoxical entities as normative facts (and, specifically,
regularities of behaviour that fix the right way of doing something) appear. I have no
general theory of normative facts.35
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 7 Can abstract entities be causes?
76 Suppose that X says to Y “Please, take five oranges from the bowl on the table in the
kitchen, and seven oranges from the fridge, and bring them all in the dining room”. When
Y then shows up in the dining room with twelve oranges, it is difficult to maintain that
the  number  5,  the  number  7,  and  the  fact  that  5+7=12  should  play  no  role  in  the
explanation  of  Y’s  behaviour.  An  explanation  should,  of  course,  mention  Y’s  mental
states: it is because he has representations of the numbers 5 and 7, and he believes that 5
+7=12, that he shows up with twelve oranges. It is exactly because his mental states have
these contents, however, that he acts this way. We cannot, it seems to me, eliminate the
numbers themselves, and their relations, from the explanation.
77 This is just to voice my perplexity about the general claim that abstract entities can play
no causal role - specifically, no role in the explanation of behaviour. What concerns us
here, however, is this claim as related to reasons for action (under the assumption that
reasons for action are abstract entities).
78 This is yet another facet of the reasons v. causes issue (above, section 5). Moreso clearly
sees the problem. He claims that, since abstract entities can play no causal role, pre-
conventions and similar  phenomena,  being (I  claim) abstract  entities,  cannot explain
behaviour. And, since reasons for action, if they are to have any normative bite (i.e., fix
the right way of doing something), must be abstract entities, then either pre-conventions
(as I also claim) play a role in explaining behaviour, having, however, no normative bite,
or they do have normative bite,  but in this case they can play no role in explaining
behaviour.
79 This is Moreso’s dilemma. My reply is twofold. 
80 First, I shall once again rely on Williams’ point (above, section 5). X is a fit candidate for
being a reason for action only if it is in principle capable of explaining action.
81 Second, Moreso himself (2016: 80) notes that his considerations “leave the problem of
intentionality untouched: how are we, thinking bodies, moved by numbers, meanings,
possible states of affairs, reasons for action?”. So, in fact, he claims that we are moved by
numbers or reasons for action – which is to say, I think, that such entities play a role in
explaining (i.e., they contribute to causing) our behaviour. What Moreso here mentions as
a further problem, calling it “the problem of intentionality”, is, then, premised on the
negation of one of the premises of his dilemma (i.e.,  that abstract entities cannot be
causes). And it is, in fact, the same problem that his dilemma is intended to solve (albeit
negatively), and that, I think, should lead us to the recognition that there are entities
(among them, I claim in my paper, pre-conventions) that are both reasons and causes.
82 It doesn’t seem to me that Frege’s idea of the mind’s “grasping” “thoughts”, or Husserl’s
idea that the object of our mental states are “noemata”, are less mysterious than the idea
that abstract entities (as, for instance, the front crawl stroke, or phonemes) can be causes
of our behaviour.
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8 On the relationship between pre-conventions and
Lewis-type conventions
83 Smith (2016: 71): Celano “suggests that pre-conventions make the existence of Lewis-type
conventions  possible”  (“pre-conventions  are  needed  for  the  existence  of  Lewis-type
conventions”); but, Smith argues, first, “if pre-conventions are needed, it is only at the
formative stage of the development of the Lewis-type convention”, and, second, they are
probably not needed at all, not even at this formative stage.
84 As to the first of these two claims, the issue revolves around the interpretation of Lewis’
remark that “were it not that we happen uniformly to notice some analogies and ignore
others - those we call ‘natural’ or ‘artificial’, respectively – precedents would always be
completely ambiguous and worthless” (Lewis 1969: 37-8).36
85 According to Smith, the relevance of this fact is confined to the formative stage of a
Lewis- convention (“it is important to recognise that the issue here concerns how Lewis-
type  conventions  are  established,  not  how  they  are  maintained  once  they  are
established”).
86 I disagree. It is true that according to Lewis, as Smith rightly emphasizes, as the number
of precedents increases,  ambiguity decreases,  until finally a “regularity” (1969:  38) of
behaviour settles. Does this mean, however, that the fact that “we happen uniformly to
notice  some  analogies  and  ignore  others  –  those  we  call  ‘natural’  or  ‘artificial’,
respectively” doesn’t play a role any more, or even that its importance is reduced? I do
not think so.
87 Generally speaking, coordination by convention is, according to Lewis, coordination by
precedent. Coordination by precedent is, in turn, convergence of the involved individuals
on a coordination equilibrium which is, for them, salient, and
“salience in general is uniqueness of a coordination equilibrium in a preeminently
conspicuous respect. The salience due to precedent is no exception: it is uniqueness
of a coordination equilibrium in virtue of its preeminently conspicuous analogy to what
was done successfully before” (Lewis 1969: 38; emphasis mine).
88 This point, is, in Lewis’ account, perfectly general. Specifically, it doesn’t apply only to the
“formative stage of the development of [a] Lewis-type convention”, to use Smith’s phrase.
89 A conventional regularity of behaviour exists – it comes into existence, and it continues
to exist - when we (the involved individuals) are all
“acquainted with a class of previous coordination problems, naturally analogous to
our present problem and to each other, in which analogous coordination equilibria
were reached. This is to say that the agents’ actions conformed to some noticeable
regularity. Since our present problem is suitably analogous to the precedents, we can
reach a coordination equilibrium by all conforming to this same regularity” (Lewis
1969: 39; emphasis mine).
90 Or, in other words, “coordination by precedent” is
“achievement of coordination by means of shared acquaintance with a regularity
[footnote omitted] governing the achievement of coordination in a class of past
cases  which  bear  some  conspicuous  analogy to  one  another  and  to  our  present
coordination problem” (Lewis 1969: 41; emphasis mine).
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91 And, finally, a convention exists, and continues to exist, when the individuals involved
extrapolate from precedents to present and future cases (hence the connection, in my
paper, to the argument about induction). How does this work? Here’s Lewis’ answer:
“Given a regularity in past cases, we may reasonably extrapolate it into the (near)
future. For we are entitled to expect that when agents acquainted with the past
regularity  are  confronted  by  an  analogous new  coordination  problem,  they  will
succeed  in  achieving  coordination  by  following  precedent  and  continuing  to
conform to the same regularity” (Lewis 1969: 41; emphasis mine).
92 So, I do not think that, as Smith (2016: 74) claims, “if pre-conventions are needed, it is
only at the formative stage of the development of the Lewis-type convention”.
93 Be that as it may, Smith (Smith 2016: 74) concedes that “if pre-conventions are needed at
any stage in the development of a Lewis-type convention, then identifying this fact is a
major contribution of Celano’s paper”. Not even this suggestion, however, is a plausible
one, according to Smith (2016: 75): “given the broad sense of ‘agreement’ used by Celano”,
Smith argues, positing the existence of pre-conventions at the formative stage of a Lewis
convention “may not take us very far beyond the suggestion that we all just happen to
draw the same analogies in the early stages of developing a Lewis-type convention”.37
94 But  here,  it  seems  to  me,  a  misunderstanding  is  responsible  for  our  apparent
disagreement.  As we have just  seen,  positing the existence of  pre-conventions of  the
relevant kind does not, Smith contends, “take us very far beyond the suggestion that we
all just happen to draw the same analogies”. (It does not “advance[s] our understanding
of this process further than the suggestion that it just happens to be the case that we tend
to draw the same analogies”.) I agree. Rather, my point was that the fact that we happen
to  notice  the  same  analogies  itself  is the  relevant  pre-convention  (when it  is  not  a
biological  datum,  and  further  relevant  conditions  are  satisfied),  not  that  it  is  the
consequence  of  (the  existence  of)  a  pre-convention  (and  the  same  holds,  mutatis
mutandis, for induction generally).38
 
9 What can pre-conventions do for legal theory? 
95 On this score, I said nothing in my paper, and I have nothing to say now. Some of the
contributors, however, put forward their suggestions.
96 Chiassoni (2017: Sec. 3): 
“jurists can learn a lot from Celano’s theory of pre-conventions. In my view, the
learning mainly consists in getting hold of two points. First, legal experience surely
does contain legal pre-conventions, which are worth discovering and bringing to
the fore.  Legal sociologists,  psychologists and anthropologists  should set to that
valuable task. Second, the practice of law, in its everyday workings, takes place on a
background of  extra-legal  pre-conventions,  above all  and insofar  as  language is
involved”.
97 These are interesting suggestions. I should note, however, that, as I emphasised above
(section 6),  Chiassoni’s  remarks are premised on a notion of  normative fact which is
sharply at odds with mine.39 This difference comes to light in his claiming that the task of
studying pre-conventions in the law is a task for “legal sociologists, psychologists and
anthropologists”. A plausible consequence of my account is, I think, that if there are legal
pre-conventions, this should have deep implications for legal theory (or, jurisprudence) as
well.
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98 This is, indeed, what Segatti claims. He puts forward two suggestions. If there are, in fact,
pre-conventions (as I understand them in my paper) then
“so-called paradigm cases of law /…/ lose much of their centrality. To study pre-
conventions  or  norm-conforming  behaviour  [Brigaglia’s  notion],  we  also  need
accounts of situations in which relevant agents use criteria for identifying relevant
legal phenomena that only approximate valid sources of law /…/ To provide such
accounts, the traditional informational focus of a philosophical analysis of law also
needs, I suspect, substantial broadening: if pre-conventions are in the body, then that
is where we need to look if we want to study them” (Segatti 2017: Sec. 5). 
99 These are, indeed, valuable suggestions, worthy of serious enquiry. The first point, or a
very similar one, may also be put thus: the threshold beyond which X (a norm, a decision,
an act) is a fit candidate for being judged legally valid, or invalid, is in the Background.40
 
10 No argument? 
100 Duarte d’Almeida (2017: Par. 2) claims that the main thesis of my paper (what he calls –
above, section 3 – my “third” thesis: pre-conventions “have both a normative character
and the character of de facto regularities” (Section 1 of Celano 2016); they are “entities of a
‘peculiar sort’ /…/ that somehow straddle the commonly accepted distinction between
facts and norms”) “is  a bold thesis;  but it  is  one for which Celano gives us no good
argument”.
101 It is true that the third thesis is one for which I gave no good argument. In fact, I offered
three  (or  better  four)  non-original  arguments  –  the  Lewis-Goodman  ones  about  our
noticing, as a matter of fact, the same analogies, and about the projection of predicates in
induction,  Wittgenstein’s  rule-following  argument,  and  Searle’s  argument  about  the
Background  as  the  necessary  condition  for  the  functioning  of  any  intentionality  –
claiming  that  they  can  be  read  together  as  pointing in  the  same direction,  viz.  the
existence of entities of that sort. (This is why I wrote: “the arguments themselves are not
mine; but the light in which I present them is, it seems to me, somewhat original”, section
3 of my paper; and, at the beginning of section 4: “I now turn to a summary presentation
(it is, in fact, the evocation of arguments that I assume to be, more or less, already known
to the reader) of some arguments that support the view. [These arguments] turn out to
have similar implications from the point of view that concerns us here”.) Does Duarte
d’Almeida have problems with any of these arguments, or maybe all of them, or my claim
that they can all be read as pointing in that direction? It is hard to tell, since, with the
exception of a brief passing remark about – my supposedly mistaken reading of – Searle’s
argument,41 he does not discuss them at all (he announces, “I leave to one side his [i.e.,
my] discussions of Bourdieu, Foucault, Wittgenstein, and other authors”), nor does he
discuss my claim that they can be read together as pointing in that direction. (How, then,
can he conclude that I  have “failed to discharge [my] argumentative burdens”?)42 So,
sadly, were Duarte d’Almeida can find no argument, I can find no objection.
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NOTES
1. I owe this label to Giusi Todaro.
2. Three remarks are in place here. 1) Throughout this paper, I shall use, following Searle, the
word  “Background”  with  a  capital  “B”.  This  is  not  meant  to  express  full,  unqualified
endorsement  of  Searle’s  views.  The  term  designates,  here,  the  “blank  space”  in  which  pre-
conventions  are  located,  which is  the  object  of  Searle’s  claims,  and which Searle’s  linguistic
inventiveness  so effectively  labels.  2)  I  shall  quote extensively  from the contributions of  my
critics. These quotations, however, are only meant as a reminder of their claims. Readers are
assumed to be acquainted with their papers. 3) I cannot discuss all of the many remarks of my
critics. This would be an Herculean task, one which I am not up to and which would, at times,
lead us too far away from our present concerns. So, I’ll put aside many interesting issues which
are touched upon by my critics (as, for instance, Arena’s (2016: Sec. 2) and Brigaglia’s (2016: Sec.
3.4) valuable comments on philosophical method). Force majeure.
3. Arena (2016: 63, 64): “[L]abelling as conventional the activity both of an isolated human being
and of many people,  even if  convergent,  when there is  no relationship between them would
remain outside the semantic field of convention”; “the realm of conventions is the realm of social
activities.  Conventions  bridge  individuals  who  are  otherwise  isolated.  Even  if  the  idea  of
embodiment may throw light on some conventional phenomena, it leaves unexplained the way
in which conventions glue the activities of people onto each other”.
4. Smith (2016: 70): “Celano distinguishes pre-conventions from other types of convention on the
basis that pre-conventions are not amenable to ‘rational explanation’, in the sense that there is
no ‘“train of reasoning” explaining the behaviour of the relevant parties.’ In other words, pre-
conventions do not involve ‘the reasoned pursuit, by each of the parties involved, of their own
goals’  [footnote  omitted]”.  But,  he  observes,  “this  characterisation of  pre-conventions  is  not
entirely  perspicuous”.  This  is  unfortunate,  because  so  much  in  my  paper  depends  on  this
characterisation. What I meant is that, on this sort of account, conventions are explained as the
output of rational choices by the parties involved – rational choice explanations; not necessarily,
however, formalisable ones, in the format of standard rational choice theory –, just as it happens
in Lewis’  theory (see also the clarifications in the text,  two paragraphs below).  This was not
totally obscure in my paper, however. After saying that “this characterisation of pre-conventions
is not entirely perspicuous”, Smith (2016: 70) goes on “but it appears that Celano has in mind a
contrast with views such as David Lewis’ claim that a convention is a way of satisfying people’s
higher-order preferences in the face of a recurring coordination problem” (it is not clear to me
why Smith speaks,  here,  of “higher-order” preferences,  but this is immaterial  to the present
issue).  Yes.  This  is  why I  wrote  (Celano  2016:  12):  “to  date,  the  most  influential  theories  of
conventions  are  those  of David  Hume  and  David  Lewis.  These  theories  try  to  account  for
conventions that are agreements /…/ backed by a tacit train of reasoning. Hume and Lewis – and,
in  their  wake,  others  –  provide  an  explanation  of  conventions  as  the  result  of  decisions  by
rational individuals pursuing their own interests, in the absence of an explicit agreement” (but
please note that, to my mind – see note 18 of my paper –, although it is a widely held view that
Hume’s  and  Lewis’  accounts  share  this  feature,  this  view  turns  out  to  rest  on  a
mischaracterisation  of  the  former).  And  pre-conventions  are  explicitly  characterised,  in  my
paper, as not having this feature.
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5. This is not an example of a convention, but Arena’s point is that activities such as these do not
belong  to  the  “Background”  in  any  interesting  sense,  and  that  most  of  my  so-called  "pre-
conventions" are of this kind.
6. Before I begin, however, I should note that I find Brigaglia’s distinction between “rules” and
“norms”, and between “R-behaviour” and “N-behaviour”, illuminating, and it seems to me that it
effectively captures – as, indeed, it is intended to do – a fundamental dimension of my account.
He  argues  that  “the  Rules  vs.  Norms  Framework  plays  a  crucial  role  in  Celano’s  argument”
(Brigaglia 2016: 48). This is plainly true – although this framework is, in fact, something that he
has made explicit,  and systematically articulated.  (I  find myself,  now, strongly in debt to his
commentary for this achievement.) Likewise, what Brigaglia (2016: Sec. 3.2) says concerning the
centrality,  in  my  account,  of  a  psychological  perspective  is  also  to  the  point.  I  defend  a
psychologistic approach to the study of normative phenomena in Celano 2017.
7. Sánchez Brigido (2017: Sec. 3): “not all the examples that Celano proposes are examples of
[‘basic’  normative facts]  /…/ One should distinguish between believing that a certain way of
proceeding is correct, even if such a belief is so internalised that my acting in accordance with it
is unreflective, from those facts (if there are such facts) that work as the condition of possibility
of applying rules or concepts in the first place. Not every belief concerning what is correct, even
if unreflective, need be a basic normative fact”.
8. The passage by Smith I am about to quote also raises, inextricably, the second of the two issues
I listed at the beginning of this section: “pre-conventions” are nothing but ordinary habits and
acquired dispositions. Under this respect, readers will find my reply in the next sub-section.
9. This is, I think, the “ambiguity” that, according to Arena (2016: Sec. 5), affects Searle’s notion
of  the  Background,  and,  through  the  latter,  infects  my  treatment  of  pre-conventions  (“the
entities that interest me are agreements which are ‘tacit’ in the latter [i.e., the not-being-an-
earthworm] sense”, I wrote in section 4 of my paper (Celano 2016: 15)), leading him to distinguish
between “embodied conventions” generally, and “pre-conventions” as a species of the latter –
namely, those embodied conventions, if any, which are part of the Background.
10. See Brigaglia’s contribution: “one and the same scheme ‘A in S’ could function for one and the
same agent at different moments either as a rule or as a norm. Think, for example, about a Lewis-
convention: the relevant behaviour, Celano says, can initially be performed under the guidance
of proper reasoning (R-behaviour) and then become automatic (N-behaviour) [Celano 2016: 13];
but, the agent could, at some moment, be able to stop the habit and make again explicit the rule
she follows (again R-behaviour). In other words, one and the same scheme ‘A in S’ for one and the
same agent can be subject to a ‘functional shift’ from rule to norm and vice versa” (Brigaglia 2016:
42-43). This is also meant to address one of Arena’s main worries (section 5 of his paper).
11. The difficulty is also clearly stated in Brigaglia’s contribution. See Brigaglia 2016: fn. 14.
12. That  my  considerations  do  not  define  the  relevant  sense  of  “tacit”  is  underscored  in
Brigaglia’s  contribution,  footnote  14.  Here  is  how  Brigaglia  (2016:  43)  explains  this  crucial
distinction: “one and the same scheme ‘A in S’ for one and the same agent can be subject to a
‘functional shift’ from rule to norm and vice versa. /…/ But, we should be aware of a crucial point.
There will be cases in which the functional shift from norm to rule and from rule to norm can
occur freely: some of our norms can be made explicit, and some of our rules can become tacit. We
can, however, imagine that in other cases, given the structural or contingent limitations of our
mind, the shift cannot take place. Some rules cannot be turned into norms: we cannot automatise
some behavioural patterns that we otherwise recognise and follow as explicit rules (because they
are  ‘too  complicated’,  because  they  are  ‘too  counter-intuitive’,  and so  on).  And some norms
cannot be turned into rules: we cannot make explicit some of the norms we conform to (i.e., we
cannot consciously access and formulate their content, and sometimes we cannot even suspend
their  automatic  application).  Let  us  call  them  ‘the  deep  normative  background’  [footnote
omitted]: the part of our tacit normative background which we can neither make explicit nor
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describe nor consciously access (in the ‘intellectual’ form), but which we can only directly apply
and recognise  in  its  correct  applications  (i.e.,  we  can only  access  it  in  the  ‘non-intellectual’
form)”.
13. Note, however, that there is an important difference (and this is why I see this as only an
analogy): that I am not an earthworm is a thought that can be the content of a “that-clause”. (As
it indeed is in the previous sentence.)
14. Searle attributes full awareness of this point to Nietzsche, in Searle 1995: 132.
15. I should also point out that I find correct and precisely to the point Brigaglia’s idea of a wide
range  of  possibilities,  of  which  pure  R-behaviour  and  pure  N-behaviour  are  the  extremes.
(According  to  Brigaglia  (2016:  44),  we  can  easily  imagine  “‘hybrid’  combinations”  of  the
properties  defining, respectively,  R-  and N-behaviour.  And,  says  Brigaglia,  “given this  varied
landscape, the sharply differentiated R- and N-behaviour can be better conceived as paradigms:
they show, in the clearest way, the sense in which a normative behaviour and the underlying
standard of correctness can be said to be ‘explicit’ or ‘tacit’, and offer an approximate grid for
distinguishing and classifying non-paradigmatic cases in virtue of their reputed similarity with
either of the two paradigms”.) In particular, I find Brigaglia’s sorting out of various intermediate
possibilities (Sec. 2) illuminating.
16. Chiassoni  (2017:  Sec.  3):  “a  pre-convention  is  a  convergent  behaviour  of  some  group  of
people, and such behaviour gets its sense, meaning, or value from a set of background social
rules. It may be, as Celano suggests, that the people involved in the convergent behaviour (the
practice) do what they do as a ‘second nature’: as if it were a piece of biological behaviour, with
them  being  unable  to  articulate  the  rules  that  they  are  applying.  Nonetheless,  from  a
genealogical standpoint, there are rules in the background: I would not be performing a crawl
stroke if a set of rules defining crawl swimming were non-existent” ; “it is rather the effect of the
practical learning of some system of rules /…/, in such a way that ‘the body takes over’: i.e., the
behaviour corresponding to that system of rules is performed by each of the agents involved in
an automatic, unreflective, unintentional, rapid, fluid, effortless way, as if it were a biological
regularity,  so  that  people  are  (usually)  not  able  to  articulate  the  system of  rules  that  their
convergent  behaviours  put  into  practice”.  This  characterisation  of  pre-conventions  is  not,
however, intended by Chiassoni as defusing my claims about their nature (see below, section 6).
17. The reader will have noticed that there still are some omitted lines in the latter quotation.
These lines are devoted to making the point that the Background is an “explanatory apparatus”.
That invoking Background abilities is also (see below, in the text) an explanatory hypothesis –
that items in the Background work as causes - is something I do not, and did not, deny, on the
contrary  (below,  section  5).  Duarte  d’Almeida  too,  in  explaining  what  the  actual  point  –  as
opposed  to  my alleged  mischaracterisation  -  of  Searle’s  passage  quoted  in  my paper  is  (see
above),  reproduces  some  of  the  lines  which  I  omitted  in  my  original  quotation:  “repeated
practice  and  training  in  a  variety  of  situations  eventually  makes  the  causal  functioning  of
representation unnecessary in the exercise of the skill”. Duarte d’Almeida, however, does not
quote also the lines I have just reproduced, in italics, in the text – and which are, as I have just
claimed in the text, the crucial ones.
18. And this  is  where,  I  think,  the  key to  the  alleged “non-propositionality”  of  “norms” (in
Brigaglia’s sense) should be found (see above, 3.1, my non-reply to Brigaglia’s objection). It is not
only that, as Brigaglia rightly observes, expert swimmers do not, when swimming, try – either
consciously or unconsciously (see below) – to follow the instruction “the hand ought to enter
into  the  water  finger-tips  first,  lengthening forward in  front  of  the  same shoulder  with the
middle finger pointing the way to the far end of the pool” (Brigaglia 2016: fn. 40). The point is
that, it seems to me, nobody can learn, or even understand, how to swim the front crawl, or to
recognise a correct front crawl stroke, by simply listening to, or reading, instructions like this.
Think of a common experience: it is often plainly impossible to understand how to operate a tool,
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device or machine, by reading beforehand the instructions for use. One has to manipulate it, and
try. The instructions become understandable ex post: we understand what the words, and their
combination, mean, thanks to (“in”) our attempts. (I am well aware, however, that this remark is
vague, and that it falls short of being an explanation, or even a good clarification.)
19. Brigaglia (2016: 42): “(Celano argues, following Wittgenstein), any instance of R-behaviour is
necessarily interconnected with, must rely upon, some form of N-behaviour: to avoid infinite
regress, there must necessarily be, at some point, an understanding of the concepts appearing in
a  rule,  which  does  not  consist  in  following  other  rules  specifying  their  meaning,  but  which
consists in an automatic (and shared) discrimination between cases which do constitute a token
(i.e., a correct application) of the concept and cases which do not. In short, all rules necessarily
rely on a background of norms”.
20. This is, as we have seen already, the idea conveyed by the 1983 key passage about advanced
skiers. The parallel passage in the 1995 book immediately precedes the key passage, and concerns
learning how to play baseball.  It  is  worth quoting at length here:  “suppose a baseball  player
learns how to play baseball. At the beginning he actually learns a set of rules, principles, and
strategies. But after he gets skilled, his behavior becomes much more fluent, much more melodic,
much more responsive to the demands of the situation. In such a case, it seems to me, he is not
applying the rules more skilfully; rather, he has acquired a set of dispositions or skills to respond
appropriately, where the appropriateness is actually determined by the structure of the rules,
strategies, and principles of baseball. The basic idea, /…/ is that one can develop, one can evolve,
a set of abilities that are sensitive to specific structures of intentionality without actually being
constituted  by  that  intentionality.  One  develops  skills  and  abilities  that  are,  so  to  speak,
functionally equivalent to the system of rules, without actually containing any representations
or internalizations of those rules” (Searle 1995: 141-2).
21. Figueroa Rubio (2017: Sec. 3): “here, the first thing that has to be clarified is what it means
when we say that an ability is sensitive to structures of intentionality, and how we can explain
this” (he also aptly asks what I mean by “functional equivalence”). My remarks in section 7 of my
paper  were  intended  as  an  –  admittedly  problematic  and  non-exhaustive  –  answer  to  this
question.
22. I say that Sánchez Brigido’s statement merely seems to forget my warning because he goes on
mentioning “completely personal, regular and idiosyncratic habits” (Sánchez Brigido 2017: Sec.
3). To the extent that these are the phenomena that he has in mind, his objection, too, revolves
on my neglecting what Arena calls “the social dimension” of pre-conventions (above, section 2).
23. Smith acknowledges that style may (further objections should be met, he says, before we can
safely draw this conclusion) be a matter of, inter alia, pre-conventions.
24. I agree with Smith, then, that the know-how involved in playing chess well “need not involve
any form of agreement” (my emphasis) nor do I think that I suggested the opposite.
25. This is the place for dealing with a suggestion by Moreso (2016: 79): “it is rather odd that
Celano does not refer /…/ to a human practice which displays all the traits of pre-conventions. /
…/  linguistic  practice”.  I  did  not  mention  linguistic  practice  on  purpose.  Language  is  too
complicated a subject. In dealing with it, peculiar difficulties crop up at every step. I simply do
not know whether, and how, the notion of pre-convention might be useful in accounting for
linguistic practice. It must be, I guess.
26. This is not meant, by Sánchez Brigido, as expressing his own views. It is rather intended to
point out a supposed problematic consequence of the “general philosophical framework” which I
apparently  endorse,  and  with  which,  according  to  Sánchez  Brigido,  my  argument  is  most
naturally,  given  my general  approach,  supplemented,  namely  Searle’s  one.  As  we  have  seen
already (above, section 3), Duarte d’Almeida emphasises that Searle’s point, both in the 1983 key
passage and in the 1995 one, is an explanatory one, implying by this, I think, that the body’s
“taking over” makes, in fact, no normative difference. The issue is raised also by Figueroa Rubio
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(2017: Sec. 3): “in contrast to reasons /…/, causes are related to regularities and their grammar is
not  evaluative”;  “we  can  make  intelligible  pre-conventions  as  regularities  through  causal
explanation, but we cannot assess the behaviour as correct or incorrect. If we choose this path,
we face the risk of reducing pre-conventions to de facto regularities in our aiming to explain
them”.
27. At  times,  it  is  not  clear  to  me  whether  his  question  concerns  the  explanation  of  pre-
conventions - their coming into existence, and continued existence – or the kind of explanation
of behaviour provided by appealing, as its cause, to the existence of a preconvention. These are
different issues. I assume – following what he, in most relevant passages, unequivocally says –
that his remarks are meant to address the former issue.
28. Williams called this “the dimension of possible explanation, a consideration which applies to
any reason for action”: “if  something can be a reason for action, then it  could be someone’s
reason for acting on a particular occasion, and it would then figure in an explanation of that
action” (Williams 1981: 106).
29. Duarte d’Almeida (2017: Par. 11) charges me with a serious mistake: “de facto regularities are
facts, not norms; but it does not follow that every ‘entity’ which is not a de facto regularity is not a
factual ‘entity’, or that it must fall somewhere ‘in between a norm and a regularity’”. This is true,
of course. I can think of many examples of things which are factual entities, and do not fall in
between a norm and a regularity, although they are not regularities. The moon is a case in point.
But I did not draw, I think, the fallacious inference Duarte d’Almeida charges me with. I gave
examples and offered (non-original) arguments (on these, see below, section 10) purporting to
show (whether successfully or not, is another matter) that there are things which are not mere de
facto regularities and fall in between a norm and a regularity, in the sense of partaking of both.
30. Chiassoni (2017: Sec. 3) claims that “Celano’s pre-conventions are /.../ ‘normative facts’, both
in the sense of being facts qualified by (social) norms and in the sense of being facts that are
indexes, evidence, or representations of (social) norms. /…/ On the one hand, a pre-convention is
a convergent behaviour of some group of people, and such behaviour gets its sense, meaning, or
value from a set of background social rules. /…/ from a genealogical standpoint, there are rules
in the background: I  would not be performing a crawl stroke if  a set of rules defining crawl
swimming were non-existent. /…/ On the other hand, a pre-convention is a convergent social
behaviour that is an index, evidence, and representation of some set of background social rules”.
These two characterisations of pre-conventions, however, both presuppose the divide between
facts and norms that, I claim, pre-conventions (and other entities, probably) call into question.
31. Duarte d’Almeida (2017:  Par.  14):  Celano “should /…/ have been /…/ much more precise
about what it is that he takes a ‘normative fact’ to (‘literally’) be”.
32. It doesn’t take much for Sánchez Brigido himself to spell out the relevant notion of a fact
(Sánchez Brigido 2017: Sec. 3): “that which is contingently the case, an item which is related to
other items in the world by causal relations or the appearance of such relations depending on
your way of conceiving causality”.
33. Sánchez Brigido (2017: Sec. 3) also claims that I should be clear about whether mine is “a
metaphysical claim, a conceptual claim, a logical claim” - or whether I would, perhaps, “object to
this sort of distinction”. I have no general objection against this distinction, of course. But, once
again, I cannot see how not taking a stand on this issue vitiates my account.
34. Sánchez Brigido (2017: Sec. 6) sketches “an alternative, Kantian-like conception of normative
facts based on an argument put forward by Christine Korsgaard”.  He then suggests that this
alternative view might be an improvement on mine, to the extent that “the general Kantian
framework  to  which  it  belongs  both  claims  that  practical  reason  /…/  is  the  condition  of
possibility of all action guided by norms, and is committed to the idea that questions related to
how events are causally related are completely out of order from the perspective of practical
reason. When we see ourselves from a practical point of view, we simply cannot see ourselves as
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items governed by causality. Seeing ourselves as items governed by causality belongs to the camp
of  theoretical  reason,  and not  the domain of  practical  reason.  So the alternative  conception
seems plausible, even if it assumes a sharp distinction between facts and norms”. This is not the
place, of course, to discuss this proposed alternative in detail.  I  note, however, that it  is not
entirely true that “the general Kantian framework to which it belongs /…/ is committed to the
idea that questions related to how events are causally related are completely out of order from
the perspective of practical reason”. True, according to this framework, “when we see ourselves
from a practical point of view, we simply cannot see ourselves as items governed by causality”.
The general  Kantian framework,  however,  is committed to the idea that rational beings,  qua
moral  agents,  are  uncaused causes  of  phenomena:  it  is,  namely,  committed  to  the  idea  that
rational agents are capable of, in Kant’s words, “causality by virtue of freedom” (they are, when
acting morally, first movers unmoved, as Chisholm put it). Free action is not caused, but it is,
from the perspective of practical reason, itself a cause of spatio-temporal events. Does Sánchez
Brigido want to buy this?
35. This is also the place to deal with a remark by Smith concerning my (inchoate: “somewhat
imprecise and not very strict considerations”, as I say in section 6 of my paper) discussion of the
distinction between nature and culture. Given that (I claim that) pre-conventions are genuine
conventions,  Smith wonders,  “how can they transcend the nature/convention distinction,  as
Celano claims?”. The puzzle is not, however, as intractable as it may appear at first sight, and
Smith goes on to solve it himself: “I take it that the thought is that pre-conventions are genuine
conventions, but possess features of the natural, and so help show that ‘nature’ and ‘convention’
are not mutually exclusive categories”. Yes, the thought was this. (Smith himself refers, in this
connection, to “Celano 2016: 91”.)
36. This passage of Lewis’ is quoted extensively in section 4 of my paper. It should be understood,
of course, that what Lewis here means by “natural” covers also what, in the terminology of my
paper, belongs to our “second nature”.
37. Or, in other words, it is at least doubtful, according to Smith (2016: 74–75), whether “positing
the existence of pre-conventions advances our understanding of this process further than the
suggestion that it just happens to be the case that we tend to draw the same analogies”.
38. “The fortunate fact that, for the most part /…/ certain analogies, and not others, appear
obvious to us is not /.../ a mere regularity: it is also what fixes the identity of R, /…/ determining
what is the correct way to behave. [Footnote omitted] It is, in short, a normative fact” (Celano
2016: 22). Celano, says Smith (2016: 73), “suggests that our tendency to all draw the same analogy
is often due to the existence of a pre-convention” (emphasis mine). This wasn’t my claim.
39. Chiassoni (2017: Sec. 2): “in order to account for the many different relationships between
facts and law, facts and legal norms, we do not need to surrender to the confusing mysteries of
romantic  and  post-romantic  jurisprudence.  We  do  not  need  to  assume  the  existence  of
mysterious entities, which would simultaneously partake in both the factual and the normative. /
…/ We can always and profitable keep apart, for any individual event whatsoever, the factual and
the normative.  This keeping apart is,  apparently,  the key to understanding legal phenomena
clearly”. Pre-conventions, as I understand them, are, I fear, on the wrong side of this theoretical
divide.
40. This, though phrased in different terms, is one of the conclusions in Celano 2002. Brigaglia,
too,  suggests  (Brigaglia 2016:  Sec.  3.3)  that pre-conventions,  and norm-guided behaviour (his
notion) generally, may be of help in legal theory, specifically, in understanding authority, and in
dealing with the vexata quaestio of the background of normality which underlies rule-oriented
reasoning - namely, the issue of the conditions under which reconsideration of applicable rules is
justified (we tried to flesh out the latter suggestion, in the light of our common psychologistic
framework, in Brigaglia & Celano 2017).
41. Above section 3. I dealt with his objection there.
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42. Also: “Celano comes across as meaning to imply that the existence of pre-conventions upsets
the view that these two distinctions [i.e., the distinction between mere de facto regularities and
rules, and the distinction between facts and norms] are indeed mutually exclusive. Remember
Celano’s opening paragraph: he asserts that pre-conventions have both the character of de facto
regularities, and normative character. /…/ pre-conventions, he says, ‘are, literally, ‘normative
facts’ [here he remarks in brackets: “oddly, the adverb clashes with his use of quotation marks
around ‘normative facts’”.  I  wouldn’t  say,  however,  “in the present sentence,  the expression
twilight has to be taken literally”, but rather “in the present sentence, the expression ‘twilight’
has to be taken literally”. This is how I heard the sentence, and this is why I inserted the inverted
commas]. But what does he give us by way of argument to support such view? Not very much, as
far as I can see. He does avail himself of several metaphors, and he is particularly fond of Searle’s
‘the body takes over’ phrase” (as noted above, section 3, Duarte d’Almeida seems to take Searle’s
argument in ch. 6 of The Construction of Social Reality, 1995, as making the same point as Searle’s
1983 description of what happens when the body of the skier takes over).
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